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LEGISLATION
NEW JERSEY-179TH LEGISLATURE-SALE OF LAND
TO VOLUNTEER FIRE COMPANIES-LEASES.*
I.
INTRODUCTION.
Recently the New Jersey Legislature enacted a law authorizing
municipalities to convey lands, for which there no longer exists an essential
public purpose, to duly incorporated volunteer fire companies, at a nominal
fee.' The favored companies are then to erect suitable fire houses or fire
schools. Acts such as this have seldom failed to escape examination under
the state constitutional prohibitions concerning the donation of land or
money by a municipality to any association, society, or corporation.2 It
is the purpose of this paper to examine the act in the light of these restraints.




An Act to amend "An act concerning the sale of land by municipalities to
volunteer fire companies, and supplementing chapter 60 of Title 40
of the Revised Statutes," approved July 15, 1954 (P.L.1954, c. 143).
Be it enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:
1. Section 1 of the act of which this act is amendatory is amended to read as
follows:
1. When the governing body of a municipality shall determine that any land
owned by the municipality is no longer desirable, necessary or required for public
purposes, it may by resolution authorize the sale and conveyance of the same for a
nominal consideration to a duly incorporated volunteer fire company of the munici-
pality, for the erection thereon of a fire house or for the erection thereon of, or the
use thereof including any buildings thereon as, a fire school.
Any such land including any buildings thereon sold and conveyed to any duly
incorporated volunteer fire company may be leased by such fire company to any
volunteer firemen's association for the erection thereon of, or the use thereof as,
a fire school for the benefit of the members of such association.
2. This act shall take effect immediately.
Approved and effective July 11, 1955.
1. N.J. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 127, § 1.
2. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, para. 2: "No county, city, borough, town, town-
ship or village shall hereafter give any money or property, or loan its money or
credit, to or in aid of any individual, association or corporation, or become security
for, or be directly or indirectly the owner of, any stocks or bonds of any association
or corporation." N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, para. 3: "No donation of land or ap-
propriation of money shall be made by the state or any municipal corporation
to or for the use of any society, association or corporation whatever."
(138)
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With the arrival of the nineteenth century, the United States wit-
nessed a feverish expansion in the development of its systems of transporta-
tion. Not infrequently this growth was prompted by a manifest willing-
ness of the part of the states to support such ventures. Eventually, what
had originated as a promising state policy, became an imminent threat to its
economy.3 Delegates to the New Jersey Constitutional Convention of 1844
were keenly aware of the dangers which too frequently accompanied such
subsidization. To prevent a similar occurrence, a provision, denying the
state any authority to extend its credit, was included.4 With the electoral
amendments of 1875, which enlarged the prohibition concerning donations
and appropriations in support of private enterprises so that it included
counties and municipalities, a sound lock appeared to have been applied to
the door of the treasury. 5 The New Jersey constitution, revised in 1947,
has incorporated these articles verbatim.6
III.
CONSIDERATION.
Though important problems were solved by these provisions, others
of perhaps equal importance arose. Courts, faced with the frequent in-
vocation of the donatary articles, searched industriously into issues to un-
cover benefits accruing to the state or the municipality which would obviate
the necessity of declaring a-law unconstitutional. The payment of a moral
obligation, incidental to the state's educational program was adjudged not
violative.7 Compensation for services rendered a municipality in the trans-
portation of county officials and police officers was held a cost item of police
protection, and therefore not within the constitutional prohibition." Stat-
utes authorizing the purchase of a water company, 9 or an addition thereto 10
have withstood the test of constitutionality. Further, the granting of pen-
sions to retired police officers has been held a binding obligation, and an
3. 2 LINCOLN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK, 80, 81 (1906).
4. PROCEEDINGS, NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1844, 64.
5. N.J. CONST. art. XIX, para. 19 (as amended by election of 1875) ; N.J.
CONST. art. XIX, para. 20 (as amended by election of 1875).
6. City of Camden v. South Jersey Port Commission, 4 N.J. 357, 73 A.2d 55,
60 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (dictum) ; Application of Wellhofer, 137 N.J.L. 165, 59 A.2d 393,
398 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (dictum).
7. Trustees of Rutgers College v. Morgan, 70 N.J.L. 460, 57 Atl. 250 (Sup.
Ct. 1904).
8. City of Newark v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 9 N.J. Misc. 722,
155 Atl. 469 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
9. Carr v. Borough of Merchantville, 102 N.J.L. 553, 142 Atl. 1 (Sup. Ct.
1926); Brady v. City of Bayonne, 57 N.J.L. 379, 30 Atl. 968 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
10. Borough of Runnemede v. New Jersey Water Company, 123 N.J.L. 383,
8 A.2d 576 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939).
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inducing cause of the claimant's entry into the city's employ." A statute
which authorized a compromise of taxes, however, met with opposition
in these articles, 12 which have been held to prohibit indirect as well as direct
support to private corporations.1 3 The preceding, and other cases evince a
marked similarity in that the expenditure of public funds, questioned in
each, has found justification in a recognized moral, legal, or equitable obliga-
tion on the part of the municipality.
IV.
PUBLIC PURPOSE.
More indicative of the seemingly inherent flexibility of the donatary
articles, is the readiness of the judiciary to apply the public purpose test
to what would, on its face, seem doubtful legislation. An explicit manifesta-
tion of this frequently utilized test 14 is found in the case of Lynch v.
Borough of Edgewater." The court held that the determination of whether
a statute violates the constitutional provision prohibiting the donation of
public money to private individuals depends upon whether the statute in
question was enacted for a private or a public purpose. Statutes evincing
a causal or substantial relationship to the public welfare present little diffi-
culty in issues involving the constitutionality of municipal contributions.
Expenditures for housing, 16 highways, 17 port improvement,' 8 libraries,' 9
and the protection of personal and property rights 20 have all withstood
inquiry into their constitutionality in the form of the public purpose test.
In Trustees of Free Public Library of Newark v. Civil Service Commis-
sion of New Jersey, Vorhees J., observed:
"To justify the donation of public moneys, it seems necessary to
regard these organizations as public agencies of the state, created by it
11. Emanuel v. Sproat, 136 N.J.L. 154, 54 A.2d 765 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; Hayes v.
Mayor and Council of City of Hoboken, 93 N.J.L. 432, 108 Ati. 868 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1919).
12. New Jersey Bell Telephone Company v. City of Newark, 136 N.J. Eq. 479,
42 A.2d 629 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945); In re Voorhees Estate, 123 N.J. Eq. 142,
196 Atl. 365 (Prerog. Ct. 1938). But see, Hudson and M.R. Company v. Jersey
City, 6 N.J. Super. 333, 71 A.2d 220 (1950).
13. Wilentz v. Hendrickson, 133 N.J. Eq. 447, 33 A.2d 336 (Ch. 1943); In re
Voorhees Estate, 123 N.J. Eq. 142, 196 Atl. 365 (Prerog. Ct. 1938) ; Mayor of
Jersey City v. North Jersey St. Ry., 78 N.J.L. 72, 73 Atl. 609 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
14. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, 133 N.J.L.
350, 44 A.2d 333 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945) ; Simon v. O'Toole, 108 N.J.L. 549, 155
Atl. 449 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
15. 8 N.J. 279, 85 A.2d 191 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
16. Redfern v. Board of Commissioners of Jersey City, 137 N.J.L. 356, 59 A.2d
641 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948) ; Romano v. Housing Authority of City of Newark, 123
N.J.L. 428, 10 A.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
17. Behnke v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 25 N.J. Super. 149, 95 A.2d
606 (1953).
18. City of Camden v. South Jersey Port Commission, 4 N.J. 357, 73 A.2d
55 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
19. Trustees of Free Public Library of Newark v. Civil Service Commission
of New Jersey, 83 N.J.L. 196, 83 AtI. 980 (Sup. Ct. 1912).
20. Lynch v. Borough of Edgewater, 8 N.J. 279, 85 A.2d 191 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
[ VOL. 1.
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in connection with its municipalities and as an incidental part of their
government." 21
The introduction and development of this test within the courts has done
much to clarify the meaning of these provisions. It would not be incorrect
to conclude that it has been instrumental in the accrual of numerous bene-
fits to the community. But such a test, involving as it does, questions of
degree, is not immune from criticism, particularly as to what limits the
courts will endure.22 This is especially relevant in view of the "nominal
consideration" clause in the instant statute when read in conjunction with
the statement of Case, J. in the case of JaMouneau v. Local Board of Divi-
sion of Local Government in State Department of Taxation and Finance:
"When we say give away we refer to the legal conception of a
clear and substantial deficiency in consideration for giving up a source
of city revenue, even though the deficiency may not have been perceived
by the city when the resolution was adopted and became demonstrated
only on the review." 23
V.
CONCLUSION.
An examination of the decisions on the issue of state and municipal
contributions and extensions of credit reveals that courts have most fre-
quently focused their attention upon the purpose of the recipient or the
authorizing statute, and then have drawn their conclusions as to the con-
stitutionality of the law. Thus it appears that the existence or the extent
of control exercised by a municipality over a particular volunteer fire com-
pany is of slight moment, since the evident public purpose involved should
provide ample justification for the conveyance of land at a nominal fee.
John J. Collins
PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATION-1955 SESSION-
CLASSIFIED INCOME TAX BILL.*
THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION AND STATE INCOME TAXATION.
For many years the legislature of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
has been struggling without success with the income tax problem. On the
few occasions when they passed such legislation, their efforts have been
21. Trustees of Free Public Library of Newark v. Civil Service Commission
of New Jersey, 83 N.J.L. 196, 203, 83 Atl. 980, 982 (Sup. Ct. 1912) (dictum).
22. Strock v. City of East Orange, 77 N.J.L. 382, 384, 72 At. 34, 35 (Sup.
Ct. 1909) (dictum).
23. Jamouneau v. Local Government Board of Division of Local Government
in State Department of Taxation and Finance, 6 N.J. 281, 78 A.2d 553, 559, 560
(Sup. Ct. 1951).
* See Appendix A.
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declared unconstitutional by the judicial bodies of the state.' The income tax
problem was recently brought into the foreground when the Classified
Income Tax Bill,2 supported by Governor George M. Leader, met a hasty
death at the hands of the State Senate. While the proposed tax measure
thus escaped formal judicial attention, efforts to tap new sources of revenue
are ever-continuing, and it is to be expected that legislation aimed at taxing
the income earned by individuals will be introduced again in the near, if
not immediate, future. With this thought in mind, the relevant provisions
of the state constitution will be examined as well as past judicial decisions
on income tax legislation, in an effort to determine: (1) the skeleton form
of an income tax provision that would meet the requirements of the state
constitution, and (2) whether the proposed taxing measure co-sponsored
by House Majority Leader Readinger and Representative Breth would
have successfully hurdled the constitutional barrier, had it met with ap-





The term "income" may be refined by the use of the modifiers, "gross"
and "net." The former refers to an all-inclusive concept of income, while
the latter refers to the amount remaining after deducting from the gross
income figure the necessary expenses incurred in the realization of this gross
income. While the popular concept of income taxation refers to the levy-
ing of a tax on the net income figure, this concept must be examined in
the light of the limitations of the Pennsylvania constitution to determine
whether or not "net income" may be the proper subject of revenue-
procuring legislation in the Commonwealth.
The pertinent section of the state constitution reads: "All taxes shall
be uniform .. .," 8 and this phraseology has been interpreted to encom-
pass the entire field of taxation.4 Certainly, gross income is a proper
subject of taxation, as each party is taxed on what he has earned "in toto,"
and uniformity would be present, insofar as the subject matter alone is
concerned. However, when considering the term net income, it must be
recognized that different parties who earn the same amount (gross income)
may pay different taxes on this amount due to the difference in deductible
expenses that each might have. In a technical sense, this point would
appear to show a non-uniform taxing measure that would necessarily be
1. Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 180, 181 Atd. 598 (1935) ; Banger's Appeal, 109
Pa. 79 (1885).
2. PA. H.R. 878, Sess. of 1955.
3. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1923).
4. Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 180, 191, 181 Atl. 598, 602 (1935); In re
Cope's Estate, 191 Pa. 1, 21, 43 At. 79, 81 (1899).
[VOL. 1.
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unconstitutional, for it is the uniformity of the tax in application, rather
than the mere uniformity of the taxing law that is demanded by the
constitution."
Looking to present-day income taxation in the Commonwealth, one
finds the Corporation Income Tax Law,6 the Corporation Net Income Tax
Act,7 as well as various local ordinances which tax the income of individuals
through the mechanism of the Sterling Act.8 Typical of the latter group
is the tax imposed on "salaries, wages, commissions and other compensa-
tion" by the City of Philadelphia.9 This ordinance replaced a prior enact-
ment " which contained exemption clauses. The judiciary found the ex-
emption clauses to be unconstitutional,". but relied on the saving clause
to preserve the remainder of the ordinance. However, the enactment was
then immediately repealed 12 and replaced by the present wage tax.' 3 The
inference to be drawn from these decisions is that "net income," as we
have defined the term (gross income minus the necessary expenses in-
curred in the realization of that income), is a proper subject of taxation
under the Pennsylvania constitution; for, while it is true that exemptions
were not permitted, net profits were taxed in those areas of business ac-
tivity that demand cost expenditures. Thus, it would appear that the
Philadelphia ordinance taxes the gross "take-home" pay of the individual,
which comes within our definition of "net income." One problem present
in any discussion of the wage tax is that a working man's deduction for
the necessary expenses incurred in the attainment of his gross income is
not found in the ordinance, and yet the collection regulations allow this
practice. 14 However, this problem properly comes under the heading of
classification problems, which will be discussed separately in this Comment.
In discussing these expenses reference is not made to commutation costs,
and items of that nature, which have been thoroughly examined by the
federal courts, but rather reference is made to such "required" expenses as
union dues.
The state-imposed taxes on the net income of corporations further
confuse the issue. While the Corporation Net Income Tax Act states
that it is an excise tax,15 not all courts have so interpreted it. One theory
proposed is that the tax is an excise tax on corporations for the privilege
5. Commonwealth v. Shamokin, S. & L. R.R., 3 Dauph. 168 (Pa. 1900).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §3420n (Supp. 1954).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §3420 (Supp. 1954).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §4613 (Supp. 1954).
9. Ordinance of the Philadelphia City Council, 656. Approved December 13, 1939.
10. Ordinince of the Philadelphia City Council, 512. Approved November 26,
1938.
11. Butcher v. Philadelphia, 333 Pa. 497, 6 A.2d 298 (1938).
12. Ordinance of the Philadelphia City Council, 1. Approved January 7, 1939.
13. Ordinance of the Philadelphia City Council, 656. Approved December 13,
1939.
14. 2 CCH STATE TAX REPORTER (PA.) 1 73-051a (1954).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §3420c (Supp. 1954).
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of doing business in Pennsylvania, and that the net income figure is used
merely as a base for the application of this levy. 6 This might well be
called the "Dauphin County" view. The opposing view is encountered in
the cases supporting the validity of the Philadelphia Mercantile Tax,17
which is a result of the Sterling Act. In order to uphold the constitu-
tionality of the mercantile tax, the court had to hold that the Corporation
Net Income Tax act was a property tax, since if the latter was found to
be an excise tax, the mercantile tax would be void because of the mandatory
pre-emption provisions of the Sterling Act 18 which prohibit duplication of
subject matter of taxation between the state and the municipality.
The Corporation Income Tax Act 19 states in its provisions that it is
a property tax on net income. However, little weight is given these state-
ments which are used to preserve constitutionality. If it were considered to
be an excise tax it would violate the federal constitution since its scope is
so broad that it could tax a foreign corporation for the privilege of engaging
in interstate commerce. The question of whether this tax is a property tax
has not been litigated. In the only reported case testing the application of
the act, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed on the federal ground
the lower court ruling that the tax was assessable on the petitioner.r
Hence the court did not have to decide whether the tax was a property tax
or an excise tax. In the light of this decision it would appear that a revenue
measure levied on net income in the nature of a property tax would be
constitutional. The uniformity provision would be satisfied since all those
subject to the tax would be taking the same steps in ascertaining the amount
on which the tax would be levied, namely, gross income less expenses in-
curred in the realization of this income. If this is true, a fortiori, a tax
assessed on gross income would be constitutional.
While the classification basis of the Philadelphia Wage Tax as such
has never been litigated such differentiation might well be found uncon-
stitutional. This tax is assessed on total (gross) salaries, commissions,
wages and other compensation, but on net profits.2 1 While the rationale
may be that the tax is levied on gross take-home pay, this is not necessarily
carried out by the tax, since union dues and other absolutely necessary
business expenses to a salaried worker are not deducted from his total wage
16. Commonwealth v. Baker-Whitely Coal Co., 60 Dauph. 434, 74 Pa. D. & C. 13
(C.P. Dauph. 1950) ; Commonwealth v. Electrolux Corp., 59 Dauph. 412 (Pa. 1949);
Commonwealth v. Warner Brothers Theatres, Inc., 345 Pa. 270, 27 A.2d 62 (1942);
Commonwealth v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 51 Dauph. 90 (Pa. 1941).
17. National Biscuit Co. v. Philadelphia, 374 Pa. 604, 98 A.2d 182 (1953);
Blauner's, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 330 Pa. 342, 198 Ati. 889 (1938).
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 4613 (Supp. 1954).
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3420n (Supp. 1954).
20. Roy Stone Transfer Corp. v. Messner, 64 Dauph. 240 (Pa. 1953), rev'd on
other grounds, 377 Pa. 234, 103 A.2d 700 (1954).
21. Ordinance of the Philadelphia City Council, 656, 658. Approved December
13, 1939. Though the constitutionality of the classification has never been litigated,
the classification was held reasonable with regard to the fact that the ordinance went
into effect one year earlier on salary workers than on net profits. Dole v. Philadel-
phia, 337 Pa. 375, 11 A.2d 163 (1940).
[VOL. 1.
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figure in arriving at his taxable figure.22 However, it may be properly
argued that this apparent differentiation is not real. Although the act
itself does not provide for the deduction of necessary expenses by the
working man, the collection regulations do so provide.3 Thus, in applica-
tion, the treatment is equal.
B.
Requirement of Uniformity.
The Pennsylvania constitution states without exception that all taxes
levied through the power of the General Assembly must be uniform upon
the same class of subjects.2 4 While it is a recognized fact that absolute
equality in taxation is not attainable, 25 nevertheless, uniformity of rates
and mechanism of assessment must be present in order to satisfy the re-
quirements of the constitution.2 6  Uniformity of taxes in application is
required by the constitution, rather than mere uniformity of the provision. 27
To illustrate this point it is worthwhile considering a tax that has uniform
provisions, and yet is unconstitutional because these provisions, in their
application, do not assess the levy in a uniform manner, either because a
deduction is given one class, or because another group receives an exemp-
tion. Non-uniformity, as the term is understood in a taxing sense, may be
present in a revenue measure in any one of several ways. It may occur
by allowing exemptions in tax legislation other than those permitted by
the constitution of the Commonwealth; 28 the violation of the uniformity
provision may occur where there is a feigned system of classification 29
or where the revenue measure is not uniform in its fundamental rate ap-
plication.30 We will discuss each of these topics separately.
1. Exemption and Deduction Provisions.
While exemption clauses in revenue measures might seem to be an
entirely separate topic, due to the wording of the Pennsylvania constitu-
tion they are so interwoven with the concept of uniform taxation as to
demand joint treatment.8 1  Not only does the constitution set forth the
property that may be exempted from taxation by the Commonwealth, but
22. See note 21 supra.
23. 2 CCH STATE TAX REPORTER (PA.) 73-051a (1954).
24. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1923).
25. Commonwealth v. Brink's Inc., 346 Pa. 296, 30 A.2d 128 (1943) ; Common-
wealth v. Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Co., 278 Pa. 338, 123 Atl. 315(1924); Mineral R.R. and Mining Co. v. Northumberland County Comm'rs, 229
Pa. 436, 78 Atl. 991 (1911).
26. Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 180, 181 Atl. 598 (1935); In re Cope's Estate,
191 Pa. 1, 43 Atl. 79 (1899).
27. Commonwealth v. Shamokin, S. & L. R.R., 3 Dauph. 168 (Pa. 1900).
28. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1923) ; PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
29. In re Cope's Estate, 191 Pa. 1, 43 Atl. 79 (1899).
30. Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 180, 181 Atl. 598 (1935).
31. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1923); PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
LEGISLATION
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it states that, "All laws exempting property from taxation, other than the
above enumerated shall be void." 32 The courts of Pennsylvania have dealt
strongly with all revenue legislation containing provisions exempting prop-
erty which cannot be classified under the specific constitutional exemp-
tions. 8   The Income Tax Act of 1935, which exempted individuals who
earned less than a stated net income, was declared unconstitutional.8 4
Another legislative enactment, which exempted certain privately held lands
from taxation, met the same fate.36 - This act. afforded a property owner
the opportunity to-qualify his property as state forest land, thus reducing
his assessment valuation-to one dollar an acre.36  A taxing statute of 1885,
which proposed to exempt income received from bills, notes and labor
done, had this provision deleted by the court, though the remainder of the
act was declared constitutional.8 7 In a more recent decision, the judiciary
deleted a deduction clause and a provision extending an exemption from
the 1938 Philadelphia Ordinance taxing net income. 3 8  The remainder of
the ordinance was upheld because of this saving clause but the City Council
immediately repealed the ordinance., 9 The only situation, apparently,
where an exemption clause outside the wording of the constitution has
been allowed occurred when the revenue law existed before the passage
of the present constitution.40 Even in this situation, however, the policy
against exemptions has been voiced.41 Clearly, then, as the constitution
now reads, any and all exemption and deduction clauses that cannot be
made to fit into the specified exemption classifications of the constitution
are illegal.
2. Classification.
The constitutional requirement of uniformity demands a true and
honest division of classes, where such classes are to be taxed in a different
32. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2. "All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of
subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be
levied and collected under general laws; but the General Assembly may, by general
laws, exempt from taxation public property used for public purposes, actual places
of religious worship, places of burial not used or held for private or corporate profit,
institutions of purely public charity, and real and personal property owned, occupied,
and used by any branch, post, or camp of honorably discharged soldiers, sailors, and
marines." PA. CONST. art. IX, §1 (1923).
33. PA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 1 (1923).
34. Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 180, 181 Atl. 598 (1935).
35. Clearfield Bituminous Coal Corp. v. Thomas, 336 Pa. 572, 9 A.2d 727 (1939).
36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§82, 83 (1935).
37. Fox's Appeal, 112 Pa. 337, 4 Atl. 149 (1886).
38. Butcher v. Philadelphia, 333 Pa. 497, 6 A.2d 298 (1938).
39. Ordinance of the Philadelphia City Council, 1. Approved January 7, 1939.
40. Walker's Appeal, 44 Pa. Super. 145 (1910).
41. An earlier opinion, based on similar facts, held that while the legislature
should be given some time to adjust the legislative changes in the tax system caused
by the passage of the constitution, the new constitution prohibited all exemptions
other than those specified in the uniformity provision regardless of when the par-
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manner. Where the classification of subjects presented by the taxing law
does not meet this standard, the tax is unconstitutional as it fails to meet
the uniformity requirement of the constitution.4 It has been held that a
pretended classification which is based solely on the difference in quantity
of precisely the same kind of property, is necessarily unjust, arbitrary, and
illegal.4
3
The courts have found that bituminous and anthracite coal may be
classified differently, 44 as may foreign and domestic insurance companies, 45
and corporate and individual debts.4 6  Surely, these decisions give the
reader no concrete guide as to what type of decision to expect in the future.
The line of permissive classification is drawn fine in many cases, and the
courts rely on factors like the chemical make-up of the product, its system
of refinement, or 'its use to reach their conclusion.4 7 The courts state that
it is a recognized fact that in arranging a scheme of classification as a basis
for taxation, the legislature may properly consider the purpose behind a
given set of circumstances and make the existence of such purpose the
controlling element in determining tax liability.48 For,
"Classification is not necessarily based on any essential difference
in the nature, or, indeed, the condition of the various subjects; it may
be based on the want of adaptability to the same methods of taxation,
or upon the impracticability of applying to the same subjects the same
methods, so as to produce just and reasonably uniform results, or it
may be based on well-rounded considerations of public policy." 49
Under the Corporate Net Income Tax Act, as amended in 1947,50 the
distinction between being taxed at one rate or another was the date of
resettlement of carry-back losses of previous years. The supreme court
held that this was a differentiation based on an unjustifiable classification.8
Yet, while one might readily accept the court's finding in this instance, is
there a real distinction for the purpose of complying with the uniformity
requirement between anthracite and bituminous coal? To go still further
into the issue, would the court have held that one type of coal could be
taxed and another not taxed? This apparently was the case in the cor-
porate field where the Corporate Net Income Tax Act preceded the Cor-
42. Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 180, 181 Ati. 598 (1935); In re Cope's Estate,
191 Pa. 1, 43 Atl. 79 (1899).
43. In re Cope's Estate, supra note 42.
44. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 274 Pa. 448, 118 Atl. 394 (1922).
45. Germania Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. 513
(1877).
46. Commonwealth v. Delaware Division Canal Co., 123 Pa. 594, 16 Atl. 584(1889).
47. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 274 Pa. 448, 118 Ati. 394 (1922).
48. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Van Valkenberg, 265 Pa. 456, 109 Atl. 208 (1920).
49. Commonwealth v. Delaware Division Canal Co., 123 Pa. 594, 621, 16 Atl.
584, 588 (1889).
50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 72, 3420b (Supp. 1054).
51. Commonwealth v. Budd Co., 379 Pa. 159, 108 A.2d 563 (1954).
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poration Income Act by nearly twenty years. The latter taxes corpora-
tions concurrently with the former, and the problem of classification when
raised today is answered by the statement that both statutes tax at the
same rates. This answer would seem to admit that for the time period
when the Corporate Income Tax did not exist, all corporations were not
uniformly taxed, since some corporations that were taxed under the second
act were not taxed by the first act. The sophisticated reasoning of the
courts in this area is usually prompted by the various municipal wage taxes,
of which Philadelphia's is typical.62  Here a distinction is made between
"wages, salaries, commissions and other forms of compensation" and the
"net profits" of a business or profession. The latter are taxed on the "net"
figure, the former on the "gross" figure. The only possible rationale for
this apparent diversity of treatment is that the authors of this measure
wanted to tax the "gross take-home" of the wage earner. This would seem
to be the case, inasmuch as the collection regulations allow wage earners a
deduction for moneys expended in the attainment of gross income in the
computation of taxable income. This last-mentioned fact is a practical off-
shoot of the purpose doctrine as outlined above, and at the same time, it
serves to point out the vagueness and inconsistency that surrounds the
courts' reasoning on classification and the uniformity clause.
3. Uniformity of Mechanism.53
The uniformity provision of the Pennsylvania constitution " demands
that taxation be applied by a uniform taxing mechanism on the same class
of subjects. This is most clearly illustrated by the case of Kelley v.
Kalodner,5  which declared the graduated income tax act of 1935 uncon-
stitutional. The court stated that a revenue provision levying a tax on the
net income of individuals at varying rates, according to income classifica-
tion, though the rates may be reasonable in themselves, violates the uni-
formity provision of the constitution. It has thus been established in
Pennsylvania that a tax imposed at different rates upon the same type, or
classification, of property, on the basis of quantity involved, offends the
uniformity clause.56 Thus, it is apparent that the uniformity provision
of our state constitution demands a single fixed procedure for the taxation
of each classification of subject matter. The question of whether or not
a classified income tax would fit within the constitutional barriers of uni-
formity is certainly worth considering. If the taxing measure set up
through the classified structure merely separates the different types of
52. Ordinance of the Philadelphia City Council, 656. Approved December 13,
1939.
53. It is to be noted that the uniformity requirement of the constitution has been
held not to apply to special assessments for street improvements, the court reasoning
that assessments for purely local benefits are of a peculiar nature and are as a special
classification of tax. Beaumont v. Wilkes-Barre, 142 Pa. 198, 21 Atd. 888 (1891).
54. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1923).
55. 320 Pa. 180, 181 At. 598 (1935).
56. Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 180, 181 Atd. 598 (1935); In re Cope's Estate,
191 Pa. 1, 43 Atl. 79 (1899).
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income and attempts to tax each in a different manner, it is merely a round-
about way of imposing a graduated income tax and would be unconstitu-
tional. In the graduated income tax you are taxing different quantities of
of the same whole in a different manner, while by the former method you
are taxing the various factors that make up these amounts in a different
manner. The only defense to such a system would be that this classifica-
tion of the different types of income and their taxation at different rates
is founded on sound and reasonable distinctions. It would be hard indeed,
to justify different rates of tax on the various ways of earning income, as
some of these means are definitely related to one another, and should not
be classified separately. While one might argue that income from labor,
in the form of salary, commissions, or wages ought to be taxed differently
than income from rents or long-term investments, it would be hard to
visualize a sound basis for a differentiation between tax rates on dividends
and rents. Again, the Philadelphia wage tax is directly in point. This
revenue ordinance taxes net profits of business and professional activity,
and gross wages and salary. While the constitutionality of its scope has
been tested many times, the courts as yet have not directly passed on its uni-
formity aspect. In upholding its constitutionality the courts have appar-
ently assumed that this is either (1) a similar tax, as uniform as the cir-
cumstances will allow, on net income (gross take-home pay), or (2) a
proper differentiation of income into separate classes. The first mentioned
assumption has been previously mentioned in this paper. It was found
that an apparently unauthorized collection regulation corrected this diver-
sity of treatment. Absent this regulation, the ordinance itself seems to
offend the uniformity provision of the constitution since it allows the earners
of one type of income to deduct necessary expenses incurred in the accumu-
lation of that income, though denying this right to salaried workers, or
those on commission. The second assumption opens a new field of discus-
sion. If we state that income from salaries, wages, commissions and other
forms of compensation is sufficiently different from income derived through
professional or business activity to justify a different manAer of taxation,
there is the further implication that all other means of procuring income
are of a still different nature, and are not to be taxed at all. Thus the
Philadelphia wage tax would appear to violate the uniformity provisions
of the constitution unless the regulations are considered part of the
ordinance.
C.
Excise Tax or Property Tax?
The courts of Pennsylvania have considered at length on various
occasions whether a tax levied on net income is in fact an income tax or an
excise tax.57 The statement in an act that it is an income tax or an excise
57. Commonwealth v. Electrolux Corp., 59 Dauph. 412 (Pa. 1949); Common-
wealth v. Warner Brothers Theaters, Inc., 345 Pa. 270, 27 A.2d 62 (1942); Com-
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tax is given little weight by the courts. The question is important for
two reasons: (1) it is a subordinate issue to the question of whether or
not an excise tax is subject to the uniformity provision of the state con-
stitution, and (2) it is determinative as to the constitutionality of a tax
that is claimed to be assessed on improper subject matter. The questions
will be considered in that order.
There has been much discussion in the courts as to whether the Cor-
porate Net Income Tax Act 68 is an excise tax or an income tax. While
the act states that it is an excise tax, and many decisions have upheld this
view,59 others have asserted that it is an income tax.60 This latter view
apparently is based on the thought that the municipal mercantile taxes
must be upheld, this, in turn, rests on a finding that the corporate net
income tax be considered an income (property) tax, or the field would be
pre-empted by the Commonwealth. On the other hand, a tax on the income
of individuals has been held to be an income tax.61 In other states, how-
ever, there is much authority for the point that an income tax is an excise
tax.6 2 Should the concession be made that a particular tax on income is an
excise tax, then the proponents of this view state the second premise of
their argument, namely, that the uniformity provisions of the state con-
stitution apply only to taxes on property. This position is defended on the
ground that the exemption provisions of the constitution refer solely to
property and that, therefore, they apply solely to property. a  However,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has expressly stated that a tax on the
income of individuals is in the nature of a tax on property.64 The court
reasoned that a tax on income is a tax on the property, both real and per-
sonal, that produces the income, as it reduces the overall value of the prop-
erty. Furthermore, income derived from property is property, as property
produces its own kind; that is, it produces property and not something
different. Therefore, whatever the name of the tax may be, the character
of the revenue measure is a property tax when the revenue is derived from
income of individuals.6 5 Thus, in Pennsylvania, a tax on the income of
individuals is a property tax, and is subject to the uniformity provisions
monwealth v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 51 Dauph. 90 (Pa. 1941) ; Turco Paint
and Varnish Co. v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 421, 184 Atl. 37 (1936) ; Kelley v. Kalodner,
320 Pa. 180, 181 Atl. 598 (1935).
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §3420 (Supp. 1954).
59. Commonwealth v. Baker-Whitely Coal Co., 60 Dauph. 434, 74 Pa. D. & C. 13
(C.P. Dauph. 1950) ; Commonwealth v. Electrolux Corp., 59 Dauph. 412 (Pa. 1949);
Commonwealth v. Warner Brothers Theatres, Inc., 345 Pa. 270, 27 A.2d 62 (1942);
Commonwealth v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 51 Dauph. 90 (Pa. 1941).
60. Turco Paint and Varnish Co. v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 421, 184 At. 37 (1936).
61. Banger's Appeal, 109 Pa. 79 (1885).
62. Simms v. Aherns, 167 Ark. 557, 271 S.W. 720 (1925) ; Diefendorf v. Gallet,
51 Idaho 619, 10 P.2d 307 (1932); Miles v. Department of the Treasury, 208 Ind.
520, 193 N.E. 855 (1935); Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, 275 Mo. 339,
205 S.W. 196 (1918).
63. Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 180, 184, 181 At. 598, 600 (1935).
64. Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 180, 181 At. 598 (1935).
65. See note 45 supra.
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of the state constitution. Whether the classification of an income tax as an
excise tax would put it beyond the application of the uniformity provision
is not certain. However, it would appear to make no difference whatso-
ever, for the terminology of the provision that is sought to be avoided is,
"All taxes shall be uniform . . ."(Emphasis added.), 66 and this phrase
has been interpreted by the courts of Pennsylvania in its broadest sense.
67
The other important reason for determining whether a tax is in the
nature of an income tax (property tax) or an excise tax lies in the fact that
although an item might be an improper subject of property taxation, it could
be a proper base for the assessment of an excise tax. To illustrate this
statement, let us assume that item A is not the proper subject of a property
tax because it violates the uniformity clause. Yet, item A could be the
proper base for the application of an excise tax, provided that the mechan-
ism of the revenue measure was uniform in rate and other essentials. The
rationale behind this latter statement is that the tax law would be uniform
in application were it an excise tax, for the subject matter of the excise tax
is the privilege of doing business or carrying on some activity within the
state and not the property itself that is made the base of such tax.
II.
OCCUPANCY OF THE FIELD.
In many states, municipalities are unable to levy taxes on a particular
subject matter due to the fact that the state has already enacted revenue-
producing legislation in that field. This doctrine of pre-emption is most
evident in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania since the Sterling Act 68 was
passed. Through this legislative enactment, the General Assembly dele-
gated its power to tax in many areas to the nmnicipalities. The act stipu-
lates, that should the Commonwealth enact similar legislation in the future,
the municipal ordinance will be rendered ineffective as of that date.6 9 Out-
standing examples of this pre-emption doctrine have occurred with regard
to corporate property,70 corporate income, 71 the privilege of using tangible
property,72 and the physical plant of a TV company. 73 Apparently in con-
flict with this doctrine would be the amusement tax which is levied by
municipalities, though the state had already enacted tax legislation on the
subjects of retail liquor sales and amusement permits. 74  The latter has
66. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1923).
67. Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 180, 191, 181 At. 598, 602 (1935) ; In re Cope's
Estate, 191 Pa. 1, 21, 43 Ati. 79, 81 (1899).
68. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §4613 (Supp. 1954).
69. See note 68 supra.
70. Dick Contracting Co. v. Hazle Twp. School District, 362 Pa. 387, 65 A.2d
381 (1949).
71. Murray v. Philadelphia, 364 Pa. 157, 71 A.2d 280 (1950).
72. Hampton v. Township School District, 362 Pa. 395, 67 A.2d 376 (1949).
73. Panther Valley TV Co. v. Borough of Summit Hill, 376 Pa. 375, 102 A.2d
699 (1954).
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §744-602 (14) (Supp. 1950).
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since been repealed.75 The court, when faced with this problem, disposed
of the issue under consideration by stating that the sole issue before the
court was whether or not a municipality in the exercise of the police power
may require a person to obtain a permit in addition to and not in conflict
with statutory regulations, and that the issue as to whether the ordinance
of the City of Pittsburgh conflicted with the legislation of the Common-
wealth was not raised on appeal in that court.76
Thus, any income tax legislation enacted by the General Assembly that
does not contain a saving clause continuing municipal wage taxes in effect
at the time, would render these local ordinances void as the field of income
taxation on that particular subject matter would automatically be pre-
empted by the Commonwealth.
III.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSED CLASSIFIED INCOME TAX.
7 7
While it has been concluded earlier in this paper that net income is
a proper subject for taxation in the Commonwealth the 1955 classified
income tax must be examined to see if it would in fact tax net income.
The 1955 bill taxed net earnings or profits in each and every category of
income covered by the act.78 Hence, it may be said with some assurance
that it was a tax on net income (gross income less the necessary expenses
incurred in the attainment of that income). Thus, the subject matter was
proper and constitutional.
A definite threat to the constitutionality of this tax measure is posed
by the optional expense deduction listed in the bill.79 This section provides
that the taxpayer may, in computing his taxable income from wages,
salaries, commissions, and other compensation for services rendered for
an employer, elect to take a blanket "necessary expense" deduction in lieu
of deducting the aggregate amount of money expended in the realization
of such income. The Income Tax Act of 1935, which was held to be
unconstitutional due to violations of the uniformity clause,80 contained
similar language. The provisions of the latter act stipulated that single
parties were entitled to a living expense exemption of one thousand dollars,
while married persons, or heads of families, were allowed a fifteen hundred
dollar exemption in computing their taxable income.8 ' It is recognized
that the optional deduction in the 1955 bill refers to a deduction used in the
computation of net income, while the exemption clauses of the 1935 act
referred to living expenses. The provisions of the 1935 act definitely
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §9-901 (Supp. 1954).
76. Puntureri v. Pittsburgh, 170 Pa. 159, 84 A.2d 516 (1951).
77. PA. H.R. 878, Sess. of 1955.
78. PA. H.R. 878, art. 2, part 2, § 205, Sess. of 1955.
79. PA. H.R. 878, art. 2, part 2, § 205h, Sess. of 1955.
80. Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 180, 181 At. 598 (1935).
81. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3402-308 (1935).
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offended the constitutional mandate against exemptions,8 2 and the optional
deduction clause of the 1955 bill must be considered in the light of the
uniformity clause of the constitution.8 3 The courts permit the deduction
of necessary expenses incurred in the attainment of gross income in order
to determine net income since the net income and not the gross income is
being subjected to taxation. However, no such rationale can be found for
the use of the optional deduction provision. It would appear that this is a
"gift" from the state only to wage earners and salaried employees. This
would discriminate against those who earn income in other manners, as
these other means of obtaining income do not have any such optional de-
deduction clause included in their application. One possible answer to this
statement is that the differentiation in taxation is justified by the differ-
ences in classification. However, assuming for the sake of argument that
there is a distinction sufficient to classify income earned by rents or divi-
dends differently from income earned by wages, does such a distinction
lie between the latter type of income and income earned by business ac-
tivity? This distinction does not appear sufficient to justify a differentiation
in taxation treatment. Hence, the deduction clause of the 1955 classified
income tax bill is apparently unconstitutional.. Another possible reason
for this optional deduction existing for the benefit of wage earners alone is
that it is an administrative or accounting simplification which is not needed
in the other area of income tax application. However, this statement loses
its force when one considers that the amount of the optional deduction is
one thousand dollars a year, and that this blanket deduction is to cover
the costs of uniforms, tools, union dues and licenses which are not sup-
plied by the employer. Furthermore, this deduction is extended to all who
earn income through salaries, wages, commissions, bonuses and other com-
pensation for services,84 and many taxpayers who come within this area
never have any expenditures of the type to be simplified by the optional
deduction clause.
Proponents of the 1955 bill might argue that it is as it states, an excise
tax, and, therefore, not subject to the uniformity provisions of the con-
stitution. An excise tax is considered as having for its subject matter a
privilege granted by the state, rather than the actual property or figure
upon which it is assessed. Hence, it might be argued that since the 1955
bill is an excise tax, it may be levied on objects that would not be the
proper subject of a property tax. However, in reply to these arguments
it is to be noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has expressly stated
that excise taxes come within the application of the uniformity clause; 85
moreover, while it is true that an excise tax may be levied on a subject
matter that would not be proper for a property tax, the uniformity provi-
82. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
83. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1923).
84. PA. H.R. 878, art. 2, part 2, § 205h, Sess. of 1955.
85. Turco Paint & Varnish Co. v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 421, 184 Atl. 37 (1936);
Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 180, 181 At. 598 (1935).
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sion of the constitution applies to the manner of determining the figure
on which the excise tax will be assessed. Thus, an excise tax whose
assessable figure is determined in a non-uniform manner is unconstitutional.
Consequently, the blanket deduction clause found in the 1955 classified
income tax bill violates the constitution whether the tax be called a prop-
erty tax or an excise tax.
Another constitutional issue is raised by the rate provisions of the
classified income tax bill. The bill provides for different rates of taxation
on different types of income. Income is split in this manner into six
classes: (1) long term capital gains, gambling winnings, prizes and
awards; 86 (2) dividends; 87 (3) interest, rents and royalties; 88 (4) in-
come derived from business, trade, or professional activity; 9 (5) salaries,
bonuses, wages, commissions, and other compensation for services; 9o
(6) all other taxable income. 91 Each class of income is taxed at a different
rate. This system of income taxation suggests two immediate problems;
(1) is this just another way of presenting a graduated income tax, and
(2) is this system of classification justified. These issues will be dis-
cussed in this order.
A graduated income tax is unconstitutional in Pennsylvania. 92 The
graduated income tax is assessed at different rates according to the size
(i.e. quantity) of the subject matter held by the taxpayer. The 1955 tax
bill professes to be a classified income tax, yet it reaches the same results
as a graduated tax. The difference is merely in the mechanics of imposing
the assessment. The graduated tax differentiates in the size of one's in-
come, while the 1955 differentiates in the manner in which the income is
obtained. In practical effect, it would appear to be a distinction of form
rather than substance. While the rates of a graduated tax increase accord-
ing to the size of one's income, the rates of the 1955 bill increase accord-
ing to that manner of obtaining income which generally would be said to
benefit those in the higher income brackets.
This variation in tax rates can be justified if there is a real and sound
basis for such classification. It is difficult to find a sound reason for classi-
fying dividends (and therefore taxing them) differently than rents; or for
taxing income from a business differently than income from wages or com-
missions. Even in the light of the vagueness and inconsistency with which
the courts have ruled on the classification problems, which were discussed
earlier, it would appear that the classifications presented by the 1955 bill are
unconstitutional. This bill not only breaks up income into parts, but it
shuffles the parts into apparently mis-jointed and non-jointed categories.
86. PA. H.R. 878, art. 2, part 1, § 201a, Sess. of 1955.
87. PA. H.R. 878, art. 2, part, 1, § 201b, Sess. of 1955.
88. PA. H.R. 878, art. 2, part 1, § 201c, Sess. of 1955.
89. PA. H.R. 878, art. 2, part 1, § 201d, Sess. of 1955.
90. PA. H.R. 878, art. 2, part 1, § 201e, Sess. of 1955.
91. PA. H.R. 878, art. 2, part 1, § 201f, Sess. of 1955.
92. Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 180, 181 At. 598 (1935).
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It is extremely doubtful whether even the rationale of the purpose doc-
trine 9 could save such a system of classification from a finding that the
attempted differentiation is unreal and unjust, and therefore, uncon-
stitutional.
One last problem concerning the constitutionality of the 1955 income
tax bill remains to be considered. It is the provision in the bill stating
that all taxes paid to any political subdivision of the Commonwealth are
to be deducted from the gross wages or salaries, and the like, in the de-
termination of the taxable (net) income. This provision affects both the
occupancy of the field question, as well as the uniformity issue. In attempt-
ing to circumvent the wage tax field, and thus evade possible pre-emption
of the area now occupied by municipalities, the 1955 bill allows the amounts
paid to political subdivisions to be deducted from gross income in arriving
at the figure representing taxable income of wages and salaries; '4 but this
deduction at first sight is not allowed in the determination of the net profits
figure upon which businesses, trades, and professions are taxed.95 How-
ever, this apparent inconsistency is easily clarified on the basis of the
manner of determining taxable income under the federal income tax law.
The business or professional income that is taxed by the 1955 bill is the
business profit as returned to and ascertained by the federal government.,,
The computation of this figure for federal income tax purposes includes
a deduction for taxes paid to political subdivisions of a state. The taxable
income from wages and salaries is assessed by the 1955 bill upon adjusted
gross income as determined for federal income tax purposes; 97 but ad-
justed gross income of an individual for federal purposes does not include
a deduction for these municipal taxes. Hence, provision is made in the
1955 bill for the deduction of these amounts by individuals. Thus, what
at first hand appears to be an irregularity in the bill turns out to be a neces-
sary provision to insure uniformity and proper classification.
IV.
CONCLUSION.
While it is true that the taxing power is vested absolutely in the legis-
lature,98 subject to the limitations of state and federal constitutions,9 9 the
courts of the Commonwealth will interfere when the legislative measures
93. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Van Valkenberg, 265 Pa. 456, 109 Atl. 208 (1920).
94. PA. H.R. 878, art. 2, part 2, § 205h, Sess. of 1955.
95. PA. H.R. 878, art. 2, part 2, § 205g, Sess. of 1955.
96. See note 95 supra.
97. PA. H.R. 878, art. 2, part 2, § 205h, Sess. of 1955.
98. Goldstein v. School District of Pittsburgh, 372 Pa. 188, 93 A.2d 243 (1952);
Commonwealth v. Hudson Coal Co., 287 Pa. 64, 134 Atl. 413 (1926); Clauser v.
Reading, 270 Pa. 92, 113 Ati. 188 (1921) ; New Castle v. Cutler, 15 Pa. Super. 612
(1901); Williamsport v. Brown, 84 Pa. 438 (1877); Washington Avenue, 69 Pa.
352 (1871) ; Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853) ; Kirby v. Shaw,
19 Pa. 258 (1852).
99. Clauser v. Reading, supra note 98.
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create inequalities, 100 or are evasions or violations of the constitution. 10 1
The courts will not have the opportunity to formally answer the question of
the constitutionality of the proposed income tax, since its passage was de-
feated by the State Senate.10 2 On the basis of the reasons set out in this
Comment, it is submitted that had the bill been enacted it would have en-
joyed a short life once the question of constitutionality reached the courts.
The constitution of Pennsylvania is written in such a way as to almost defy
modern notions of income taxation to hurdle its legal barriers; for, while
net income is recognized as a proper subject of property taxation, the uni-
formity clause '03 and the prohibition against exemptions other than those
set forth in the constitution,10 4 prevent the popular concepts of general
exemptions, personal deductions, optional deduction clauses, and graduated
rates of taxation from taking effect in Pennsylvania. Certainly, any income
tax that would escape the various tentacle-like provisions of the constitution
as it now stands, would not only be an oddity of tax legislation, but would
no doubt be lacking in revenue-producing power. The constitution of
Pennsylvania, as it now reads, is diametrically opposed to any type of taxa-
tion based on ability to pay.
It would appear, further, that the courts of the Commonwealth have
been satisfied with the original interpretations of the uniformity provisions,
and that there is no noticeable change in the judicial atmosphere which
would indicate a change in the interpretation of the relevant clauses. Ap-
parently, the only answer to the problem is to amend the constitution to
permit the modern concept of income taxation in Pennsylvania. Such an
amendment could either specifically permit a graduated income tax, or
would clothe the legislature with an unrestricted general taxing power.
Neale F. Hooley.
(Ed. Note: On September 27, 1955, a bill (House Bill
No. 1390) was passed in the House of Representatives
and has since been referred to the Senate Committee on
Constitutional Changes and Federal Relations. Intro-
duced by Messrs. Readinger and Lovett, this bill not
only includes the stipulation that the ninth article of the
state constitution should not apply to the taxation of
income, but further provides the manner in which funds
so derived are to be spent. While four similar bills have
been introduced in the legislature in recent years, none
have contained the "spending" clause written into House
Bill No. 1390).
100. New Castle v. Cutler, 15 Pa. Super. 612 (1901); Washington Avenue, 69
Pa. 352 (1871).
101. Commonwealth v. Hudson Coal Co., 287 Pa. 64, 134 Atl. 413 (1926).
102. The State Senate defeated the passage of the bill by a vote of 26-23, after
the House of Representatives had approved the measure by a vote of 108-98.
103. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1923).
104. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
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* APPENDIX A
(Pertinent sections only are included in this Appendix.)
AN AcT
To provide revenue for Commonwealth purposes by imposing an excise tax on
certain classes of taxable income as defined of individual residents and non-
residents of the Commonwealth and of estates and trusts fixing the rates of
tax thereon providing for the reporting of income payment of tax interest
and penalties and installments of estimated tax collection of tax at the source
assessments collections liens reviews appeals refunds and penalties and con-
ferring powers and imposing duties upon the Department of Revenue public
officers fiduciaries employers corporations partnerships associations and in-
dividuals
The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania hereby enacts
as follows
ARTICLE I
SHORT TITLE AND DEFINITIONS




Part I Imposition of Tax
Section 201 Tax on residents Every resident of this Commonwealth shall be
subject to and shall pay for the privilege of residing in this Commonwealth and re-
ceiving or using or holding income an excise tax which tax shall be levied collected
and paid annually upon each dollar of taxable income as herein defined received
during the taxable year at rates as follows
(a) Six per centum of the amount of taxable income from net long-term capital
gain gambling winnings prizes and awards
(b) Five per centum of the amount of taxable income from dividends
(c) Four per centum of the amount of taxable income from interest rents and
royalties
(d) Two per centum of the amount of taxable income from a business trade or
profession
(e) One per centum of the amount of taxable income from wages salaries bonuses
commissions and other compensation for services
(f) One per centum of the amount of all other taxable income
Section 202 Tax on non-residents Every natural person not a resident of this
Commonwealth shall be subject to and shall pay for the privilege of carrying on
a business trade profession or occupation within this Commonwealth or of owning or
leasing property herein an excise tax which tax shall be levied collected and paid
annually upon each dollar of his taxable income as herein defined received during
the taxable year from a business trade profession or occupation carried on within
this Commonwealth or from property owned or leased herein at rates the same as
those specified in section two hundred one
Section 203 Tax on estates and trusts The tax imposed by this part on residents
and non-residents similarly shall be levied collected and paid annually upon each
dollar of the taxable income as herein defined of estates and trusts received during
the taxable year
Part II Definitions
Section 204 Taxable income defined The term "taxable income" means the sum
of the amounts derived from the sources of income defined in section two hundred
five
* The General Assembly of Pennsylvania, House Bill No. 878, Session of 1955.
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Section 205 Sources of income defined (a) Taxable income from net long-term
capital gain The term "taxable income from net long-term capital gain" means the
excess of long-term capital gains for the taxable year over the long-term capital
losses for such year as returned to and ascertained by the Federal Government
(b) Taxable income from gambling winnings. The term "taxable income from
gambling winnings" means the amount of net profits or gains as returned to and
ascertained by the Federal Government resulting from gambling activity during the
taxable year
(c) Taxable income from prizes and awards The term "taxable income from
prizes and awards" means the amount of gross income from prizes and awards as
returned to and ascertained by the Federal Government less the ordinary and
necessary expenses of earning or collecting prizes and awards
(d) Taxable income from dividends The term "taxable income from dividends"
means the amount of gross income from dividends as returned to and ascertained
by the Federal Government less the ordinary and necessary expenses of producing
or collecting said dividends
(e) Taxable income from interest The term "taxable income from interest means
the amount of gross income from interest as returned to and ascertained by the Federal
Government less the ordinary and necessary expenses of producing or collecting said
interest and less interest received on United States securities
(f) Taxable income from rents and royalties The term "taxable income from
rents and royalties" means the net profits from rents and royalties as returned
to and ascertained by the Federal Government
(g) Taxable income from a business trade or profession The term "taxable in-
come from a business trade or profession" means the amount of business profit of
farm profit and of partnership profit as returned to and ascertained by the Federal
Government except that no deduction shall be allowed in any case for net operating
losses sustained during any other taxable year nor shall any net operating loss sus-
tained during the taxable year be allowed as a deduction for any prior taxable year
and that in computing partnership profit no amounts shall be included which are de-
rived from the sources defined in subsections (a) to (f) inclusive unless said amounts
represent profit from a bona fide business activity of the partnership In no event
shall such amounts be included as partnership profit where the partnership form is
used to avoid the tax which would otherwise be paid on the amounts derived from
these sources
(h) Taxable income from wages salaries bonuses commissions and other com-
pensation for services The term "taxable income from wages salaries bonuses com-
missions and other compensation for services" means the amount of adjusted gross
income from wages salaries bonuses and commissions and other compensation for
services including professional services performed by an employe for his employer
including the cash value of all remuneration paid in any medium other than cash
as returned to and ascertained by the Federal Government less all taxes imposed by
a political subdivision of this Commonwealth and less any other expenses of earning
producing or collecting said income not heretofore deducted in arriving at adjusted
gross income those deductions to consist of those expenses which have been actually
paid by the taxpayer during the taxable year and for which he will not be reimbursed
and shall include but not be limited to purchase and maintenance of uniforms and
tools' required by an employer union dues and assessments and license fees Such
expenses shall not include costs of personal maintenance which bear no direct rela-
tion to the earning producing or collecting of the iucome such as cost of wearing
apparel not required as a uniform food and medical expenses Provided however
That no expense shall be deducted unless actually paid out of taxable income from
wages salaries bonuses commissions and other compensation for services as defined
in this subsection and Provided further That in lieu of the expense deduction
provided in this subsection the taxpayer may elect at his option an alternate expense
deduction of one thousand dollars ($1,000)
(i) All other taxable income The term "all other taxable income" means the
amount of adjusted gross income as returned to and ascertained by the Federal
Government plus any net operating loss from any other year deducted in computing
adjusted gross income and less
(1) any amount of gross income adjusted gross income or net gains or profits
attributable to the respective sources specified in subsections (a) to (h) inclusive
and
(2) the expenses of earning producing or collecting said all other taxable income
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Section 206 Returned to and ascertained by the Federal Government defined The
term "returned to and ascertained by the Federal Government" means
(a) submitted to the Federal Government on the applicable form of tax return
or'schedule thereof for the taxable year or
(b) which would have been submitted to the Federal Government on the ap-
plicable form of tax return or schedule thereof if the individual had made a return
to the Federal Government for the taxable year subject however to any correction
for fraud evasion or error as finally ascertained by the Federal Government
ARTICLE III
COMPUTATION OF TAXABLE INCOME
Part I Estates and Trusts
Section 301 Application of tax The taxable income of estates or of any kind
of property held in trust shall include
(a) Income accumulated in trust for the benefit of unborn or unascertained per-
sons or persons with contingent interests and income accumulated or held for future
distribution under the terms of the will or trust
(b) Income which is to be distributed currently by the fiduciary to the bene-
ficiaries and income collected by a guardian of an infant which is to be held or dis-
tributed as the court may direct
(c) Income received by estates of deceased persons during the period of ad-
ministration or settlement of the estate and
(d) Income which in the discretion of the fiduciary may be either distributed
to the beneficiaries or accumulated
Section 302 Computation and payment The taxable income of an estate or trust
shall be computed in the same manner as in the case of an individual except as other-
wise provided in this part The tax shall be computed on such taxable income and
shall be paid by the fiduciary
Section 303 Additional deduction (a) In computing the taxable income of an
estate or trust there shall be allowed as an additional deduction any amount returned
to and ascertained by the Federal Government as income required to be distributed
currently or properly paid or credited or required to be distributed during the taxable
year to any beneficiary
(b) Character of amounts deducted The amount determined under subsection
(a) shall be treated as consisting of the same proportion of each class of items enter-
ing into the computation of gross income of the estate or trust as the total of each
class bears to the total gross income of the estate or trust in the absence of the
allocation of different classes of income under the specific terms of the governing
instrument
Section 304 Inclusion of amounts in gross income of beneficiaries (a) Inclusion
In computing the gross income of a beneficiary of an estate or trust there shall be
included any amount deducted under section three hundred three (a) by the estate
or trust
(b) Character of amounts included The amounts determined under subsection
(a) shall have the same character in the hands of the beneficiary as in the hands of
the estate or trust as determined under section three hundred three (b)
(c) Taxability of amounts included The amounts received by a beneficiary of
an estate or trust shall be subject to taxation according to their character as de-
termined in subsection (b) at the rates set forth in section two hundred one
Section 305 Different taxable years for estate or trust and beneficiary If the
taxable year of a beneficiary is different from that of the estate or trust the amount
to be included in the gross income of the beneficiary shall be based on the gross
income of the estate or trust and the amounts properly paid credited or required
to be distributed to the beneficiary during any taxable year or years of the estate
or trust ending within or with his taxable year
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1956], Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol1/iss1/16
160 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 1.
Part II Partners and Partnerships
Section 320 Partners subject to tax A partnership as such shall not be subject
to the tax imposed by this act Persons carrying on business as partners shall be
liable for income tax only in their separate or individual capacities
Section 321 Taxable income of partner (a) Distributive share The taxable in-
come of a partner shall include his distributive share of the net profits of the part-
nership whether distributed or not
(b) Character of distributive share The amount determined to be the partner's
distributive share of partnership profit shall have the same character in the hands
of the partner as in the hands of the partnership Any amounts not included in partner-
ship profit under section two hundred five (g) shall be stated separately and taxed
at the rates as set forth in section two hundred one
Section 322 Different taxable years for partner and partnership If the taxable
year of a partner is different from that of the partnership then the taxable income
of the partner shall be based on the taxable income of the partnership during any
taxable year of the partnership ending within the taxable year of the partner
Part III Exclusions from gross income
Section 330 General rule There shall be excluded in computing gross income
those amounts specifically excluded in the computation of income to be returned
to and ascertained by the Federal Government
Section 331 Additional exclusions In addition to the exclusions provided for in
section three hundred thirty there shall be excluded from gross income the follow-
ing items
(a) Unemployment compensation Any amount received by any person under
the provisions of the Unemployment Compensation law of this Commonwealth
(b) Public assistance Any amount received by any person as assistance under the
provisions of the Public Assistance Law of this Commonwealth
(c) Social security Any amount received by any person as social security benefits
under the Federal Social Security Act
(d) Railroad retirement or unemployment insurance Any amount received by
any person as an annuity or pension under the Federal Railroad Retirement Act or
as unemployment benefits under the Federal Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act
(e) State retirement Any amount received by any person under the provisions
of any retirement law or system of this Commonwealth or political subdivision
thereof
Part IV Miscellaneous Provisions
Section 340 Inventories Whenever in the opinion of the department the use of
inventories is necessary in order clearly to determine the income of any taxpayer
inventories shall be taken by such taxpayer on such basis as the department may
prescribe as conforming as nearly as may be to the best accounting practice in the
trade or business and as most clearly reflecting the income
ARTICLE VI
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Section 601 Saving clause Notwithstanding anything contained in any law to
the contrary the validity of any ordinance or part of any ordinance or any resolution
or part of any resolution and any amendments or supplements thereto now or here-
after enacted or adopted by any political subdivision providing for or relating to the
imposition levy or collection of any tax on wages salaries bonuses commissions or
other compensation for services or on net profits of a business trade profession or
occupation shall not be affected or impaired by anything contained in this act
Section 602 Constitutional construction If any section sentence clause or part of
this act is for any reason held to be unconstitutional the decision of the court shall
not affect or impair any of the remaining provisions of this act It is hereby declared
as the legislative intent that this act would have been adopted had such unconstitutional
sentence section clause or part thereof not been included herein
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Section 603 Effective date The provisions of this act shall take effect as follows
(a) The first day of January one thousand nine hundred fifty-five except as
specified in subsections (b) and (c)
(b) The first day of July one thousand nine hundred fifty-five for the purposes
of the tax imposed by section two hundred one (c) and the provisions of Article
IV relating to the collection of income tax at the source and any other provisions
relating to the computation and administration of said tax and the collection thereof
(c) The first day of July one thousand nine hundred fifty-five for the purpose
of making and filing the declaration of estimated tax required by section five hundred
twenty-four Payment of said tax shall be made in accordance with the provisions
of section five hundred forty-one
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